Introduction
The organizational strategies of the communist parties during the era of state socialism are among the lesser-documented aspects of the parties' rule. Yet these strategies, consisting of the means of party control over society and internal personnel policies within the party, underlied the communist parties' ability to reform and negotiate under communism. The less the parties relied on the loyalty of party members and extensive organizational networks as a way to control society, and the more pragmatic and skilled their elites, the more able the communist parties to innovate and implement policy reforms (however meager), and to negotiate with the anti-communist opposition. Moreover, these strategies also influenced politics after the collapse of communism in 1989: they formed the collective historical record and the elite skills which determined how the communist parties would survive and succeed after the regime collapse in 1989. The more the parties had encouraged pluralism within and outside their organizations, they more likely they were to gain a relatively favorable historical record and to adapt successfully to democracy.
There were two aspects to the parties' organizational strategies. First, the parties used their organizations themselves to establish and maintain authority over society: through party organizational and membership networks, the nomenklatura system, and party purges designed to punish "deviants," the leadership ensured societal compliance. These relations of power between the party and society ranged from the Czech or East German saturation of society with party organizations and members and the assertion of direct party power over schooling and employment, to the relative absence of the party from daily life in Poland and in Hungary, where party membership and organization rates were far lower, and considerable spheres of private economic and political activity made for greater societal autonomy of the party. Second, the parties' internal organizational practices-elite recruitment, advancement and turnover, and internal party pluralism-were used both to assert control over the party's makeup, and to promote cohorts with specific skills and outlooks. Here, the variation ranged from recruitment exclusively from within the party ranks and promotion based chiefly on ideological loyalty, as in the Czech party, to the more pragmatic East German emphasis on technocratic expertise, to the recruitment and cooptation of intelligentsia in Poland, in Hungary, and even in Bulgaria. Thus, the subsequent strict control over the party stifled the rise of Czech elites with practical, portable skills, who could envision and implement reform. Ironically, however, it also allowed the rise of reformist Slovak elites. The Polish and Hungarian parties, for their part, tended to recruit their elites from the outside, using political and administrative skills as criteria.
They did so more consistently than the other parties-the Bulgarian communist party, for example, engaged in such cooptation only during the period of late state socialism, in the late 1970s and beyond. As we will see, these twin practices, of societal control and of personnel recruitment were often intertwined-the more a party pursued societal saturation, the more it worried about the loyalty and reliability of the cadres who made up the party organization.
In accounting for these patterns, scholars have posited that the differences in party strategies were the result of forces outside of the party. First, prewar configurations of political parties and their constituencies shaped the bargaining over regime type immediately after World War II. 1 Thus, the communist mass parties in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia, faced with fully democratic competition and highly mobilized urban middle strata and working class during the interwar period, eventually formed highly bureaucratized and repressive communist regimes.
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According to this analysis, the Polish and Hungarian parties, with their unmobilized interwar working class and strong agrarian mobilization under semi-democratic interwar regimes, formed 4 less bureaucratized regimes after World War II. These, in turn, were more likely to coopt than to repress their potential opposition. Second, differences in the relationship with the Soviet Union 3 have been used to explain the parties' organizational strategies-the more a given party was part of the USSR's security "core," the less it had to worry about having to ensure its political monopoly, and was freer to pursue some liberalization. Alternatively, in the security "periphery," party rule was not as assured by the Soviet Union, especially in the early stages, and so the parties had to resort to repression and reliance on ideologically loyal comrades to enforce party control over society.
Third, differences in the political cultures of the societies involved 4 meant different degrees of acceptance and resistance to the communist project. Thus, where a strong working class or traditionally pro-Russian feelings existed, communist parties could take full advantage and saturate society with party organizations with little resistance or need for negotiation. At the other end of the spectrum, where parties faced a population that was particularly resistantdominated by agrarian mobilization, religious faith, or anti-Russian/ Soviet sentiment, communist parties would have to find some way to compromise with these forces in order to remain in power.
These factors clearly contributed to the parties' organizational strategies, but leave some developments unexplained. Prewar patterns had little influence in countries where the main political actors who could continue prewar patterns were obliterated, as in Poland. 5 The security priorities do not explain changes over time: Czechoslovakia became a firm part of the Soviet security framework, yet the KS did little to relax its policies, even after Stalin's death.
Moreover, relative ties to the Soviet Union do not explain the variation in the repression and control among the Romanian, Albanian, and Yugoslav parties. Political culture also does not 5 explain these patterns fully: Poland and Slovakia were similar in their agrarianism and
Catholicism, yet the party policies clearly diverged. Nor did religiosity mandate party policy: the Church was a prominent political and societal actor in Poland, but its relative weakness did not preclude similar party strategies in Hungary.
This analysis of the communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary (with briefer consideration of the East German and Bulgarian cases), seeks to fill in some of these lacunae. I first examine the parties after World War II, and the distinct ways in which the capture of their power translated into their organizational strategies. While the initial differences in these strategies were small, especially given the Stalinist brutality that followed the takeovers, they were steadily reinforced, both by deliberate replication and by regime crises. As a result, by the 1980s, the parties had very different configurations of elites, patterns of negotiation between the party and its opposition, and reform capabilities. These various configurations, in turn, implied divergent paths of transition, and distinct political possibilities for the communist parties themselves.
II. Communist Takeovers and Regime Crises
The communist captures of power after World War II led the parties to reach distinct conclusions regarding the kind of party organization that would best establish their authority, and thus, to adopt different organizational strategies. Specifically, the more the party came to power faced with powerful domestic or external opponents it was uncertain of defeating, the more it tended to view its organization as a means of establishing and retaining power. In contrast, the more assured the party felt of its power, chiefly as a result of its "importation" by the Soviet Union, the less it viewed the party organization as relevant to its hold on rule. Instead, such parties relied more on elite co-optation and societal engagement to retain the "legitimacy" of its governance. Thus, in Poland and in Hungary, the party organization itself and its efforts to saturate society played less of a role in maintaining party authority than the parties' attempts to negotiate with society through political liberalization and populist economic policies. To a lesser extent, the Bulgarian communist party in the 1960s-70s also coopted the intelligentsia and implemented cycles of economic reforms. In short, not only did the postwar communist takeovers capture power for the parties, but they also first delineated how the party would go about establishing its authority: whether the party organization would be a means of control over society, or whether the organization would be perceived as less important than elite turnover and societal engagement as a way to establish popular acquiescence.
The takeovers also set into motion the personnel policies that influenced the parties' subsequent development, including policies of recruitment, advancement, turnover, and internal pluralism. Aware of the bases for their takeover, the parties pursued different cadre policies within their organizations. The more the party relied on its organization to control society, the more demanding its standards of ideological loyalty and uniformity. These, in turn, translated 7
into willingness to open channels of party advancement and reward skill rather than ideological loyalty.
By enforcing ideology rather than pragmatism, the personnel policies also affected the parties' subsequent ability to reform policy and to negotiate with the opposition-after all, "closed" or "intramural" patterns of internal recruitment and advancement have led to orthodox, cautious, and largely conservative elites, while "open" or "extramural" policies of advancement tend to foster a more innovative, less hide-bound cohort. Similarly, higher rates of leadership turnover promote innovative and flexible policymaking. 8 They also keep the elites from entrenching themselves in any position, and create competition for prized positions.
Regime crises strengthened these differences in the parties' internal policies, sustaining these disinctions until the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989. Where the parties discounted the party members and minimized the direct control of society by party organizations, the response to the crises was more likely to consist of removing discredited party leaders, and of engaging society through reforms and negotiation. Where the party elites saw the party organization as the guarantee of its authority and control over society, on the other hand, they were more likely to hold it responsible for the failings of the communist regime, and thus set out to "improve" its reliability after regime crises through purges and punitive actions. The responses to these crises were thus not only a reflection of party cleavages, patterns of popular mobilization, and international pressures, 9 but of the parties' organization and its control over society. While there were changes over time-most notably, with the end of "national communism" and the post-Stalinist "thaw," which relaxed ideological demands and abolished the more severe party punishments, these general patterns held throughout the postwar period.
Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická Strana eskoslovenska, KS ), captured power as a mass political party, with extensive organizational networks and a large party membership. Using these to mobilize voters, it won over 40% in the free elections in 1946, 10 and a leading role in the government coalition that followed. Dissatisfied with the pace of political change, the party the party fomented a crisis among its coalition partners in February 1948
(several non-communist ministers resigned, without naming replacements), and took over power completely in a coup d'etat. Since it relied on its 20,000 organizations and close to 2.5 million party members (or over 25% of the adult population) in 1946-8 to obtain electoral support, to eliminate political competitors, and to mobilize forces during the coup, the KS continued to emphasize its mass party character, even as it did away with elections.
Having successfully emerged from domestic competition, the party's leaders considered the party structures and members as the mainstay of their power. As Central Committee members argued, "the strength of our party rests in organization, whereas the strength of other parties rests on tradition." 11 A large, loyal membership was both an enormous political resource, and the only proof the party needed of its legitimacy. It would guarantee the party's sustained control over society, and retain the same structures that brought the party into power in the free elections of 1946. It was also a way of "crowding out" other political forces-other political parties had also sought mass party membership, and the KS saw its gains as their losses. Much as the East German SED, the KS saw a mass party as a way to establish firm control over society.
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As a result, the party subsequently counted on the "saturation" of society by party members and structures to help establish its authority as legitimate, and to maintain their control of Czechoslovakia. Czech party membership rates were twice as high as those in the neighboring As befitted the vanguard of the workers, the KS consistently pursued "proper" blue-collar members. 19 As a result, the percentage of Czechoslovak party members in the intelligentsia peaked at less than a third-the KS was the one party to insist on its "working class" character until the very end. Even in East Germany, with a 28% intelligentsia share in the party, the whitecollars were relatively over-represented. In the other countries, intelligentsia and white collar rates were even higher-for example, in Bulgaria, their share of party membership topped 36%
by the 1970s.
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At the same time, since Czech blue-collar jobs were not made as dependent on party membership, there was less incentive for blue-collar workers to join, and far fewer sanctions to keep them from leaving. For example, while white-collar workers were demoted to menial jobs if they were expelled from the party, blue-collar workers faced no such punishments. Moreover, employment in the state sector was made exclusively the provenance of the party. As a result, the Czech intelligentsia and white-collar workers were the group most keen to join the party, but faced the highest ideological barriers in doing so. 21 Similar patterns appeared in the party aparat.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the KS 's long-held anti-intellectualism, levels of education had no influence on whether one became a Czech party aparat worker. 22 Even in the late 1980s, when well-educated technocrats in Poland and in Hungary dominated the party aparat and nomenklatura, the KS proudly noted that nearly 90% of its aparat came from communist, worker families.
Concerned with the purity of party ranks as a mainstay of its organizational saturation and control, 23 the Czech communist leaders purged their membership regularly, and at higher rates than any other party. In the 1948-51 period, two purges cast out 750,000 members, or 32% of the party membership. 24 Purges of the state administration sent over 150,000 people from whitecollar to factory jobs in the three-year period after the takeover. 25 After the Prague Spring, an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 were fired from their jobs, 26 and denied all but menial employment.
75% of the expelled communist party members were sent to perform manual labor.
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The specter of ideological disloyalty dominated the Czech justifications of the purges. The KS still railed against "non-Leninist thinking" as late as 1988, and insisted that it was "wholly natural and logical" 28 that the party demanded ideological responsibility from each communist, insisting that "bolshevization" was a "fully relevant and timely (aktualní)" party goal. 29 Thus, the most likely cause for purging in the Czech lands was ideological insubordination or "incorrect views," especially in the post-Prague Spring purging of any non-conformist or reformist movements. The result was the elimination of any overt reformist sentiment in the party until 1989, through continual checks, controls, and demands of more criticism and selfcriticism. Hungarians, and were subject to humiliating interviews, courtesy of the State Security Agency, after their return. 35 Censorship was also far more strict, as subscriptions to many Western journals were forbidden and domestic publications were under stricter control than either in Poland or in Hungary. In much the same way, the SED determined all access to employment and schooling, and remained "interested in all facets of a party member's life."
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The KS also directly supervised "its" employees, since it saw party presence in the factories both as an extension of party agitation and a way to ensure production quality. 37 In the mid 1980s, over 560,000 interrogations were held with state employees, with 100,000 cadres told to raise their expertise and communist loyalties. Their interlocutor? The party's Central Control and Revision Commission, which was theoretically in charge of party discipline and membership.
Moreover, there were few other hopes of employment. In contrast, Polish agriculture remained uncollectivized and in private hands, 38 and a private sector existed in Hungary and in Poland for both customer services and petty manufacturing. Those fired from their jobs could thus turn to other forms of employment-no such alternatives existed in Czechoslovakia.
In their internal organizational policies, the conservative Czech party leaders deliberately replicated a pattern of "closed" elite advancement-elites could only rise within and through the party ranks. After 1945, the purges and recruitment policies of the Czech communist party rewarded neither education nor extramural experience, but ideological loyalty. Anxious to reassert control, and suspicious of any innovations that smacked of the 1968 reform movement, the party promoted only "safe" comrades, tested by years, if not decades, of party work.
Prospective members had to apply directly to the party, and could be rejected on ideological grounds. Advancement occurred mostly through progression upwards in the party, into increasingly ideologically stagnant elite layers, so that conformist and orthodox members were the primary ones to advance in the party. The overwhelming majority of Czech and Slovak leaders were longtime party activists. 39 Although the levels of education increased with time, party leaders had no international experience, and their schooling was either at the Prague or at the Moscow party schools. 40 The youth organization, completely under party control after 1968, provided no reformist elites. 41 As a result, the Czech party elites in the 1980s were ideologically hidebound, and eventually unable to keep up with the transition of 1989.
Not even the East German SED, whose "effectiveness in suppressing dissent within its own ranks while penetrating and closely monitoring th rest of society probably esceeded that of other East European ruling parties," 42 could match the Czech stagnation. For all the lack of toleration of differences in opinion, and its demands of ideological loyalty, the SED nonetheless coopted technocrats to a greater degree than the KS , and recognized individual performance and skill.
As a result, upward mobility no longer took place exclusively within the party.
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The rates of elite turnover further demonstrate the Czech party's conservative stance towards the role of the party organization. In its effort to prevent the resurrection of "right-wing opportunism," the KS Politburo did not turn over its mid-level cadres and did not bring in any new members (unless an incumbent died) until 1987, when Miloš Jakeš's dogmatic wing took over from the conservative pragmatic Gustav Husák. 44 As a result, an average only 16% of the Politburo leadership changed every year, less than half the rates in Poland. Moreover, elites who left did so as a result of retirement or death-there was minimal horizontal movement to other positions.
The party's response to its regime crisis also reflected its concept of the party organization as the mainstay of party rule. The major reform movement, the Prague Spring of 1968, began within the party, partly because the KS had so penetrated society by that point that few centers of independent thought existed outside of the party, unlike the relatively free academic departments and scientific institutes in Poland and in Hungary. The movement began with the formulation of reform alternatives by three committees attached to the central party leadership in the 1960s. The suggestions for improving the economy eventually led to calls for political reform, the ascension of the reformist Alexander Dub ek into the party leadership, and eventually, an unprecedented renewal of both the party and its relationship to the society.
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After the Soviet-led invasion crushed the Spring, however, all these gains were reversed.
Since the impetus for the Czech liberalization had come from within the party, it instilled an even greater fear of pluralism within the party leadership. The party cadres' "treachery" had to be punished. The new leadership reasoned that without a reliable membership, it could not count on an effective and loyal public support, and so the Czechoslovak response focused on cleansing the membership ranks. The result was both a renewed ideologization of party life and a clamping down on any "dangerous" initiatives. Entire academic institutes and departments were summarily eliminated, the press and media enervated completely, and constant "loyalty checks" made party members acutely aware of the party leadership's desire for ideological reliability.
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In the most dramatic purge in the history of state socialism, over 28% of KS members were expelled from the party within a year following the Prague Spring. 47 Moreover, expulsion meant not only loss of party membership, but of employment and schooling opportunities as well, not only for the expellees but their entire families. Subsequently, constant "loyalty checks" made the remaining party members acutely aware of the party leadership's desire for ideological reliability. 48 The purge was designed to prevent any future reformist deviations in the party, while the subsequent policies of societal oppression and policy stagnation were to demonstrate that the party was once again fully in control.
Even more importantly, since 1968 itself was a reform that began within the party, no further political or economic reforms were considered by the party, for fear of a similarly disastrous loss of control over society. In contrast, even the trauma that followed 1953 in East Germany, producing the enormous purges that it did, did not preclude some (minor) future policy alterations by the SED. 49 The KS document after 1969, "The lessons of the Crisis Development" (Pou eni z krizového vývoje) denounced any attempt at political or economic reform, either then or in the future. As late as 1989, the KS leader Miloš Jakeš argued that any revision or attempt to come to terms with 1968 would mean the party would fall apart.
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Nor did the party allow internal pluralism. Any reform-minded party member bold enough to attempt to disseminate his or her views would be rewarded with both an expulsion and loss of employment. Instead of capitalizing on its reform potential of 1968, the party deliberately eliminated its residues, partly because of its fear that party foment would once again destabilize the polity. In the 1980s, following both the rise of the opposition Charter '77 and Polish Solidarity, the party rank and file grew increasingly dissatisfied with the stagnation, and produced several localized, informal discussion clubs. 51 These, however, had neither the connections to the party elite nor the access to decisionmaking to become full-fledged reform alternatives. Instead, they largely foundered at the local level or were kept out of centralized, and largely unchanged, decisionmaking structures. Therefore, party reformists in 1989, though they could now openly voice their concerns and offer alternatives, had little access to the central power structures. The more reactionary elites, with little commitment to party transformation beyond the absolutely necessary, instead took over power the party.
However, in their desire to control the Czechoslovak party, the Czech leadership created the space for Slovak reform potential. Earlier, the communist party did less well in the 1946 elections in Slovakia, and never organized as thoroughly: the membership rate at the time of the 1948 takeover was 9.1% of adult Slovaks, about a third of the rates in the Czech lands. Nor were the Slovak party members or leaders seen as particularly committed to establishing communist rule. Therefore, the Slovak component was rapidly forced to join the Czech party. 52 As a result, the Slovak party was a subservient and stagnant party backwater until 1968, and the federalization of the country. In having to cede almost all its authority to the Prague center, the of Slovak reformists could thus survive. These young scholars were unable to advance into the party's leadership prior to 1989, and thus gained far more theoretical than practical experience in policy making and implementation. Nevertheless, they were ready to assume power at a time when most older, established party officials were either too disoriented or frightened to take charge, immediately after November 1989. Similarly, pockets of East German reform thought survived in the Berlin SED Academy of Social Sciences, and their proposals helped to shape the transformation of the SED into the PDS after 1989.
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As a result, while the Czech party elites were not only unable to implement political liberalization or economic reform, but incapable of transforming the party and adapting to democracy, their Slovak counterparts were capable of preserving a more diverse membership, and gathering some measure of public support under communism, given their partial fulfillment of Slovak national aspirations. Not surprisingly, the Slovak (and to a lesser extent, the EastGerman) elites were more successful in adapting to democracy after 1989, and becoming accepted political players.
Poland
Imported from Moscow and supported by the Soviet Army, the Polish communist party was painfully aware of its lack of support after World War II. In their analyses, party leaders admitted that the Soviet presence was "crucial" to its coming to power. 57 Party leaders therefore never allowed a free election. As one enraged Politburo member explained in February 1946:
"we cannot allow 'loose' elections and an unfettered mobilization of fascist elements…we cannot allow a repeat of the Hungarian experiment [in free elections]." 58 By 1947, party leader W≈adys≈aw Gomu≈ka did not even speak about a pretense of elections, but referred to the capture of power as a "social revolution" and an "overthrow of the government." 59 The Polish party thus came to power through electoral fraud and coalitional chicanery, faced with popular distrust and enmity.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Polish party regarded its newly recruited members as unreliable and uncommitted. 60 Party members were as suspect in their loyalties as they were irrelevant to the takeover. 61 Polish party officials did not even know how many members the party had in late 1945, while their Czech counterparts had precise figures by that point. 62 Nor did the Polish leaders point to the party membership as a source of legitimization of their power.
Instead, they complained that any increase in numbers weakened the party, 63 and argued that past mass membership drives were "inseparable" from loss of quality. 64 As a result, the party never pursued the sort of mass, committed membership the Czech party did-by 1948, the Polish PZPR managed to recruit only 4.3% of the population, and subsequently averaged about 5.4% of the adult population as its members.
In contrast to the Czech saturation of society with party organizations and representatives, a fourth of Polish villages had no party organization, as late as 1987. 65 In 1958, over half of Polish villages were without party organizations, a portion that decreased to 29% by 1965. This translated into 21,000 out of 41,000 villages without party organizations, down to 12,000 villages without organizations in 1965. By 1989, there was a basic party organization for every 500 Poles, in contrast to one for every 286 Czechs. The number of central party aparat employees reflected these differences-by 1965, there were more central party aparat workers in the Czech lands than in Poland (despite the fact that Poland's population was over 3.5 times the size of the Czech), and these differences persisted. 66 The leadership's attitudes towards the aparat are also revealing: by 1945, while the Czechs had full data on aparat number and organization, the Polish party did not know either the number or placement of its aparat workers.
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Even during the otherwise ideology-bound Stalinist era, the Polish PZPR unofficially pursued intelligentsia recruitment. 68 The Polish party emphasized that the party rules did not mandate any particular composition of the party. 69 A Polish regional report noted in 1953 that more highly educated workers were needed in the aparat, the better to work with intellectuals. In its internal advancement policies, the PZPR pursued communist youth organization (Socjalistyczny Zwi zek Studentów Polskich, SZSP, earlier known as the ZSP and the ZMP)
leaders, who were effectively educated in politicking and hungry for a chance to exercise their skills. Given the persistent conflict and distrust between society and the party, the latter needed a team of capable negotiators and administrators. The party youth auxiliaries served as both a candidate pool and training ground for future elites in a setting marked less by ideology than by pragmatic problem-solving, democratic voting procedures, made political bargaining and coalition forming as the key to attaining leadership roles. 78 The party funded the youth organizations as part of the budgets of individual academic institutions, rather than that of a centralized organization, which gave the youth league considerable autonomy. The regional structure further meant that the future elites would learn how to win successive elections, manipulate coalitions, and achieve successively higher positions, while learning legal and administrative norms. 79 In short, the youth organization acted as a "school for democracy." The regime crises reflected the loose coupling between party and society, and the lack of the party's reliance on its organization. Poles repeatedly poured out onto the streets in protest in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 , prompted by economic shortages, political repression, and price raises despite tight wage policies. In the most dramatic, and most sustained, opposition movement against communist rule, these grievances culminated in the founding of the independent trade union Solidarity, which claimed 10 million members, or over a third of the Committee members were reelected. At the same time, over 50% of the first secretaries of the basic organizations were changed, as were 38% at the factory, town, and commune levels.
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Although the horizontal movements were quelled as part of the pacification of society following the imposition of martial law in December 1981, they established the generation of politicians active in democratic Polish politics today.
In response to these crises, the party reacted by exchanging party leaders (in 1956, 1970, and in 1981) , as Polish party publications openly blamed leaders for the party crises, 90 and party congresses were held to castigate those held responsible. 91 The PZPR further attempted to mend its ways and to "consult" with society, through freer elections and referenda in the 1980s. Even if it never fully liberalized either the polity or the economy, it also continued to foster its young elites, capable of both political and economic reforms.
For its part, the Solidarity movement, though self-limiting, nevertheless exerted enormous pressure on the party-state to transform not only the economy but also the polity. Occurring as it did only a few years before the democratic transition, the Solidarity era remained alive in the 23 memories of both the party elites and the populace. As the conflict between the party and the society persisted, the decade culminated in the Round Nonetheless, there were two main limitations to these efforts. First, the Polish party reformists had never clearly organized themselves prior to the transition. Second, unlike its Hungarian counterpart, the Polish opposition did nothing to support party reform efforts. The
Polish party members repeatedly revolted against its leadership, but found no support from the anti-communist opposition. 93 As a result, the party elites had the capability to transform the party into a successful democratic competitor after 1989, but had to contend with a persistent cleavage between the adherents of the former opposition and of the former communist party.
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